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Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
The influence of religion on demographic behaviors has been extensively studied 
mainly for Abrahamic religions. Although Buddhism is the world´s fourth largest 
religion and is dominant in several Asian nations experiencing very low fertility, the 
impact of Buddhism on childbearing has received comparatively little research 
attention. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
This paper draws upon a variety of data sources in different countries in Asia in order to 
test our hypothesis that Buddhism is related to low fertility.  
 
METHODS 
Religious differentials in terms of period fertility in three nations (India, Cambodia and 
Nepal) and cohort fertility in three case studies (Mongolia, Thailand and Japan) are 
analyzed. The analyses are divided into two parts: descriptive and multivariate analyses. 
 
RESULTS 
Our results suggest that Buddhist affiliation tends to be negatively or not associated 
with childbearing outcomes, controlling for education, region of residence, age and 
marital status. Although the results vary between the highly diverse contextual and 
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institutional settings investigated, we find evidence that Buddhist affiliation or devotion 
is not related to elevated fertility across these very different cultural settings.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Across the highly diverse cultural and developmental contexts under which the different 
strains of Buddhism dominate, the effect of Buddhism is consistently negatively or 
insignificantly related to fertility. These findings stand in contrast to studies of 
Abrahamic religions that tend to identify a positive link between religiosity and fertility. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A broad range of human behavior is influenced by religion and associated institutions 
including gender roles, work divisions, family formation, mortality and ageing. 
Religious differences in demographic behavior in respect to family issues are well 
documented. The high fertility of Catholic populations and low fertility of Jews in the 
United States were first documented in the 1960s (Burch 1966; Goldscheider 1967; 
Zimmer and Goldscheider 1966). More recent research has shown that Catholics have 
significantly lower rates of divorce than Protestants (Teachman 2002), while 
conservative Protestants and Mormons are more likely to enter their first marriage 
earlier than Jews and Catholics (Lehrer 2004). Meanwhile, while there has been 
significant fertility decline in some Muslim-majority countries e.g., Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Libya, Kuwait, Iran, and Oman, (Courbage and Todd 2007; Eberstadt and Shah 
2012; Sajoux and Chahoua 2012), fertility rates of the most Muslim-majority countries 
remain above the world average of 2.4 children (Roudi-Fahimi, May, and Lynch 2013). 
Moreover, at the individual level, Muslims were generally found to have more children 
and more likely to want another child than members of other religious groups (Morgan 
et al. 2002). Such evidence from many societies shows that religion plays a key role in 
family behavior. 
Religion can have both a direct and indirect influence on demographic behaviors. 
Fertility behavior is directly influenced by denominational teachings on issues related to 
childbearing, as Goldscheider (1971) noted with the “particularized theology” 
hypothesis. For instance, the prohibition by the Church of the use of artificial means of 
contraception resulted in higher fertility among Catholics in the United States 
(McQuillan 2004). Likewise, religious values concerning broader issues of social 
organization such as gender roles, attitudes towards premarital sex and divorce may 
eventually affect fertility patterns. For example, in the Mormon, conservative Protestant 
and Islamic faiths, male and female roles are clearly divided (Sherkat 2000). The 
traditional division of labor within the household is encouraged, and the lack of access 
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to economic opportunities outside the home leads to female dependency on male family 
members. The family-oriented value of these faiths may encourage women to bear 
many children. This shows that the role of religion on childbearing extends beyond 
explicit teachings on fertility. 
In addition to a clear set of rules, religious values can further influence 
demographic behaviors when religious institutions have mechanisms to communicate 
their teachings, promote compliance and punish nonconformity (McQuillan 2004). The 
teachings and practices of a religious denomination that have an impact on fertility 
frequently differ according to local conditions. A comparative study of the role of 
religion on fertility behaviors shows that, while Christian denominations in the 
Netherlands (especially Calvinist and Catholic) effectively enforced norms and 
doctrinal rules regarding fertility related matters, this was not the case in Taiwan 
(Schoonheim and Hülsken 2011). Likewise, despite the absence of an explicit 
prohibition on contraceptive use in the Quran, in countries with nationalist pronatalism 
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, birth control has been viewed as a western plot 
against Islam, serving as a tool to reduce the number of Muslims and diminish their 
power (Karim 2005; Roudi-Fahimi 2004). Fertility patterns thus are also subject to the 
political environment as well as the interaction of religious institutions and the state. 
Not all religions, however, have implicit or explicit pronatalism or proscriptions on 
behavior related to the proximate determinants of fertility. While “the religions of the 
book” such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam have some specific teachings regarding 
the use of contraception and abortion (McQuillan 2004), there are no such scriptural 
injunctions or formal codes of conduct on contraception in religions such as Buddhism 
and Hinduism (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya 1987). Consequently, family 
planning is left to individual choice due to the lack of a central religious authority, 
which can offer scriptural interpretation on issues related to childbearing and fertility. 
Although research commonly finds that more religious individuals tend to have 
more children than the less religious and the non-religious (Lehrer 1996; Kelley and De 
Graaf 1997; Lehrer 2004; McQuillan 2004; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 
2007; Philipov and Berghammer 2007; Skirbekk, Kaufmann, and Goujon 2010), most 
of these studies focus on either the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Islam and Christianity) 
or to a lesser extent on Hinduism. Previous studies have demonstrated that Christian 
and Muslim women, in particular those with a greater level of religiosity, have 
relatively high fertility across many countries. However, the relationship between 
Buddhism and childbearing has not received much scholarly attention. Buddhism is 
sometimes viewed as a philosophy rather than a religion although Buddhism is 
commonly recognized as one of the major world religions, together with Christianity, 
Islam and Hinduism (e.g. Johnson and Grim 2008; Johnson and Ross 2009; Hackett et 
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al. 2012). This makes comparisons with Abrahamic religions an interesting point of 
investigation.  
Given the absence of pronatalism and the established influence of religion on 
demographic behaviors in Buddhism, in this study we examine whether Buddhist 
followers exhibit lower fertility rates than devotees of other faiths by analyzing patterns 
of childbearing among Buddhists in various countries of South, East and Southeast 
Asia. We compare Buddhist and non-Buddhist fertility outcomes, taking into account 
background characteristics such as educational attainment and religious commitment 
when data permits. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss Buddhist teaching 
and practices related to childbearing with the intention of addressing how Buddhist 
women´s fertility differs from the fertility of women from other religious backgrounds. 
We then describe the data and methods used for the analysis. The next section presents 
descriptive comparisons of fertility by religious denominations in three Asian countries: 
Cambodia, India and Nepal. Subsequently, we present the multivariate results 
estimating religious difference in fertility controlling for relevant socioeconomic 
characteristics including age, education, union status and urbanization based on the data 
from three countries dominated by three different Buddhist traditions: Mongolia, 
Thailand and Japan. We are able to measure both religious commitment and 
childbearing in Japan, where degree of devotion is considered as an additional 
dimension of religious practice. 
 
 
2. Buddhist religion and childbearing 
Buddhism is a widespread religion in many Asian countries – and is the largest religion 
in two of the most important world economies (Japan and China). It is also widespread 
in low fertility countries such as Taiwan and South Korea (IMF 2011; Jones, Straughan, 
and Chan 2009; Westoff and Frejka 2007). There are two major traditions of Buddhism: 
Theravada (the “Teachings of the Elders”) and the Mahayana (the “Great Vehicle”). 
The two schools differ in terms of monastic rules, rituals and academic points such as 
which spiritual figure is recognized as Buddha and whether an enlightened person could 
lapse or not. Meanwhile, Vajrayana Buddhism (the “Thunderbolt Vehicle”) developed 
in India between 400 CE–900 CE is recognized as another branch of Buddhism 
although closely derived from Mahayana Buddhism. This tradition places a greater 
emphasis on the role of Buddhist priests in respect to the religious needs of lay people 
(Gellner 2001). The pronounced differences among the three schools are essentially 
related to culture, customs and periods in which Buddhism spread throughout Asia. 
Nevertheless, there is a general consensus on the core teachings of the Buddha. 
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In the present day, Theravada Buddhism is widely practiced in Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Sri Lanka. For the latter three countries, Theravada Buddhism 
was closely associated with a national identity and was established as an official 
religion several hundred years ago (Gellner 2001). Similarly, Vajrayana Buddhism 
(also termed Tibetan Buddhism) has a close connection with Tibetan nationalism. Apart 
from Tibet, Vajrayana Buddhism is also predominant in other Himalayan nations 
including Nepal, Bhutan and Mongolia. Meanwhile, Mahayana Buddhism (Chinese 
scripture) is frequently practiced in Japan, China, South Korea and Vietnam. It is 
considered to be the largest religion in Japan. 
Although Buddhism constitutes a variety of scriptures and teachings that are 
practiced differently among various groups, as we discuss below, several beliefs 
relevant to family formation and childbearing are largely shared among followers.  
Its founder, Siddharta (6
th
 and 5
th
 century BC) chose to abstain from earthly desires 
in order to attain spiritual enlightenment free from want, ignorance or hatred. In 
achieving this more peaceful and pure existence he acquired the title Buddha (the 
enlightened or awakened one). This process led him to go away from his wife (a 
wealthy princess) and his only child (a son), and thereafter to abstain from further 
sexual relations and childbearing. Indeed, one of the Buddha‟s core teachings, dukkha 
(the “Truth of Suffering”), shared among the three Buddhist doctrines, refers to life as 
generally imperfect and infused with dissatisfaction and discontent (Thathong 2012). 
Accordingly, many Buddhists perceive that life is suffering, caused by desire and 
illusions as well as accumulated karmic tendencies. While the Buddhist aim varies 
according to the school, the general goal is to break the Karmic circle of reincarnations 
through enlightenment or attaining Nirvana, a liberating state of mind, with no further 
rebirths (Hosaka and Nagayasu 1993; Gombrich 2006). Note, however, that some see 
procreation as necessary for those who still have some bad karma to be reincarnated and 
reduce this debt in their next rebirth (Faure 2003; Learman 2005). 
Since the attainment of Nirvana is brought about through personal efforts, 
Buddhism is seen as an individualistic doctrine of salvation, particularly within the 
Theravada school of thought (Gombrich 2006). The importance given to each person to 
seek spiritual liberation individually implies that there are no rigid rules that an 
individual must follow to attain Nirvana (Mole 1973:34). This emphasis on individual 
responsibility rather than God‟s will in determining an individual‟s fate is reflected in 
fertility matters. The tenets of Buddhism do not oppose contraception, and having many 
children is generally not viewed as a religious commitment since reproductive choice is 
viewed as an individual affair (Faure 2003; Falk 1989; Knodel et al. 1999). 
Furthermore, given the absence of rigid formalities and concepts of taboo (Keown 
2005), there is relatively little religious opposition to sexual and contraceptive 
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education, possibly since these issues are not related to a „sin‟ component in Buddhism 
(Falk 1989; Schak 2008).  
Not only are there no scriptural injunctions against the use of contraception, but 
Buddhist doctrine is also not particularly pronatalist. In the case of Thailand, the role of 
the individual in seeking spiritual liberation in Buddhism coincides with Thai culture, 
which stresses individualism and freedom of action (Mole 1973:65–68). Given the view 
that individuals are deemed responsible for their own fate together with the lack of 
proscriptions on contraceptive practices in Buddhism, family planning could be 
implemented freely in the interest of couples (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya 
1987:169). In contrast, opposition to birth control as an act against God‟s will was 
repeatedly mentioned in focus-group sessions conducted with southern Muslims in 
Thailand (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya 1987:164). Likewise, Schoonheim 
and Hülsken (2011) show that Buddhists in Taiwan were more favorable to family 
planning than other groups, even if they are traditional on other issues (e.g., being more 
opposed to religious intermarriage than those from other religious denominations). 
With respect to abortion, even though it is not approved on the ground of a 
violation of the precept against taking life, the practice of abortion is tolerated in 
Mahayana Buddhist countries like Taiwan, Korea and Japan (Attané and Guilmoto 
2007; Keown 1998). It is suggested that Buddhism takes a middle way on abortion, i.e., 
not treating abortion as an either/or option and in certain Buddhist traditions such as the 
Japanese there is even a memorial service, mizuko kuyo, for aborted children (Perrett 
2000). While abortion may be problematic for Buddhists who believe that human life is 
sacred, it can be permissible for health or economic hardship related reasons (Sponberg 
2005). For instance, in South Korea (which is dominated by Buddhism and 
Christianity), Buddhists tend to be less opposed to abortion than other religious groups 
(Kim and Song 2005). 
Likewise, marriage and sexuality are often positively viewed among Buddhists; 
sexuality tends neither to be seen as sinful nor something to be justified only by 
reproduction (Sponberg 2005). However, sexual activities, representing human desire, 
can cause a reinforcement of unenlightened tendencies (Suwanbubbha 2003). Devotees 
often stress the “middle way”, where too little or too much procreation should be 
avoided since it could lead to poverty and distress (Gross 1995; Kabilsingh 1998). A 
common belief among Buddhists is that they should focus on spreading the joy of 
enlightenment to others, while transmitting their genes to subsequent generations or 
extending their family lineage is less important (Childs et al. 2005; Gross 1995).  
When asked his opinion about family planning, the Dalai Lama, spiritual head of 
Tibetan Buddhism, argued that both the sanctity of human life potential as well as the 
adverse impacts of population growth should be considered, but more weight should be 
given to the latter: “From a Buddhist viewpoint every human being is precious, and one 
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should avoid family planning and birth control. But then if we look from the global 
level, that precious human life is now overcrowding the world. As a result not only is it 
a question of survival of a single human being but that of the entire humanity. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that family planning is necessary provided that it is based 
on non-violent principles” (TWA 1995:36). 
In sum, Buddhism does not have unequivocal pronatal teachings; its leaders tend 
to discuss the benefits as well as the individual and collective costs of childbearing 
(Stacey 2011). Buddhist teaching does not appear to have a clear mandate compelling 
followers to have many children as do Mormon or Catholic faiths, which embody 
strong pronatalist ideologies. In this sense, fertility behaviors of a Buddhist person 
might not differ substantially from those of individuals with no religious affiliation, 
whose fertility has commonly been found to be the lowest across religious groups 
(Frejka and Westoff 2008). Given the literature on Buddhism and childbearing 
discussed above, we hypothesize that within a country, a Buddhist devotee has a lower 
number of children than other religious denominations and a similar level of fertility to 
unaffiliated individuals. 
 
 
3. Data and methods 
The Asia-Pacific region was home to 481 million Buddhists in 2010, 98.7% of the 
world‟s Buddhist population (Hackett et al. 2012). Hence, we focus on exploring 
fertility patterns of Buddhists in Asian countries where there are a sufficient number of 
Buddhist followers and members of other religions for comparison. In doing so, this 
paper draws upon a variety of data sources in different countries in order to test our 
hypothesis that Buddhism is related to low fertility. The analyses are divided into two 
parts: descriptive and multivariate analyses. The descriptive part is based on the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for the years 2005 in Cambodia, 2006 in 
Nepal and 2005–06 in India. The Total Fertility Rates (TFR) are calculated for the 
sample of women aged 15−49 years by religious denomination. 
The multivariate analyses include a Poisson regression of the number of children 
ever born for the sample of women aged 25-49 years in Mongolia, Thailand and Japan 
using the 2003 Reproductive Health Survey (RHS) (n=6,547), the 2000 Population and 
Housing Census (n=101,107) (Minnesota Population Center 2013) and the 2000–2008 
Japanese General Social Survey (n=4,123) respectively. Although the three data sources 
are surveys of different purposes, they contain the crucial information required for our 
study, i.e., the number of children ever born and religious affiliation of the respondents. 
One major advantage of using the number of children ever born as a measurement of 
fertility is that it can measure a woman‟s lifetime fertility experience up to the moment 
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in which the data are collected. Poisson regression is chosen as an estimation method 
because the outcome (the number of children ever born) is a count variable, which is 
heavily skewed with a long right tail. Since the outcome variable is not normally 
distributed, using ordinary least squares would lead to inefficient, inconsistent and 
biased estimates. 
 
 
4. Descriptive overview of Buddhist fertility in Asia 
First, we provide the comparison of fertility differentials in three Asian countries (India, 
Cambodia and Nepal) with significant Buddhist populations based on the DHS data as 
presented in Table 1. The estimated TFRs (Total Fertility Rates) are based on births that 
have been reported for the 36 months preceding the survey among women aged 15–49 
years. Note that “no religion” was not a response option in the questionnaires used in 
these countries (except in India, where this answer is grouped together with “other”). 
We present data on total fertility rate by religion. We also include information on three 
other potentially relevant dimensions associated childbearing: average years of 
education, average age at entering first union and percentages of never-married women. 
In India, Buddhists have a TFR of 2.25 [95% CI = 2.03–2.46] children per women 
(c/w), which lies below the national average of 2.68 [95% CI = 2.65–2.71] c/w, the 
Hindu majority of 2.59 [95% CI = 2.56–2.62] c/w and Muslims with 3.40 [95% CI = 
3.3–3.5] c/w. In Cambodia, the Buddhist majority (94% population share) has a TFR of 
3.40 [95% CI = 3.3–3.5], which is similar to the national average and higher than the 
fertility of Christians and Muslims (who account for approximately 3% of the 
population) although lower than those with other religions (3% population share). In 
Nepal, Buddhist, Christian and Hindu women have lower fertility than Muslims whose 
TFR is as high as 4.60 [95% CI = 3.79–5.41]. 
Considering relevant characteristics associated with fertility, the mean years of 
education for Buddhists is close to the national average in all three countries while 
Muslims and Christians have lower and higher years of schooling than the average 
respectively. Likewise, the percentage of never-married women is higher among 
Christians and lower among Muslims as compared to Buddhists. Correspondingly, 
Muslim women have a higher TFR than Christian women across the three countries. 
However, while Buddhist fertility is below the average in Nepal and India, it is close to 
the national average in Cambodia. Notably, in Cambodia Buddhist fertility is higher 
than the Abrahamic minorities (however, the low sample size the Christian group, 
which has the lowest fertility, makes statements for this minority group less certain). 
With respect to age at marriage, Buddhists have a higher than average age at marriage 
in Cambodia and Nepal. While education can explain to a certain extent the lower TFR 
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of Buddhists compared to Muslims, other familial behaviors such as the percentage of 
never married could also be driven by the absence of pro-natalist values in Buddhism.  
In sum, the data from these three Asian countries suggest that Buddhists have 
lower or similar fertility compared to the country-level average, which gives some 
support to our hypothesis. 
 
Table 1: TFR by religion in Asia 
Country Religion 
TFR 
(15–49) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Cases 
(15–49) 
Average years 
of education 
(25–49) 
Age of first 
marriage among 
ever married 
Percent of 
never 
married 
Source 
India 
All 2.68 [2.65 ; 2.71] 124,385 4.2 17.1 20.5 
DHS 
2005-6 
Buddhist 2.25 [2.03 ; 2.46] 1,617 4.6 16.8 24.3 
Christian 2.34 [2.25 ; 2.44] 10,977 7.1 19.7 27.6 
Hindu 2.59 [2.56 ; 2.62] 89,957 4.2 17.1 19.6 
Muslim 3.4 [3.3 ; 3.5] 16,742 3.1 16.7 23.2 
Other Religions 1.89 [1.76 ; 2.04] 3,007 7.0 19.3 26.4 
Other− With None Option 4.18 [3.68 ; 4.68] 1,032 1.7 17.5 21.7 
Cambodia 
All 3.4 [3.3 ; 3.5] 16,823 3.4 19.5 31.8 
DHS 
2005 
Buddhist 3.4 [3.3 ; 3.5] 15,840 3.5 19.6 31.8 
Christian 2.0 [1.03 ; 2.97] 93 5.1 19.4 48.8 
Muslim 3.0 [2.24 ; 3.71] 315 1.7 18 31.7 
Other− No None Option 5.7 [5.02 ; 6.44] 557 0.2 17.2 18.1 
Nepal 
All 3.13 [3.02 ; 3.24] 10,793 1.9 16.9 19.9 
DHS 
2006 
Buddhist 2.74 [2.36 ; 3.12] 821 1.8 18.0 24.8 
Christian 2.31 [1.24 ; 3.4]0 101 2.1 17.6 27.8 
Hindu 3.13 [3.01 ; 3.24] 9,348 1.9 16.8 19.5 
Muslim 4.6 [3.79 ; 5.41] 330 0.9 15.8 10.8 
Other Religions 3.22 [2.35 ; 4.09] 192 2.8 19.3 27.3 
 
Source: Own calculations based on [DHS 2013]. 
 
 
5. Case studies of fertility and Buddhism in Mongolia, Thailand, and 
Japan 
Next, we investigate the relationship between Buddhism and fertility in greater depth in 
Mongolia, Thailand and Japan. The analyses are based on a Poisson regression taking 
into account the effects of education, region of residence and other covariates that can 
determine fertility. When possible, religiosity measures are also included. The three 
countries were chosen due to the diversity in the schools of Buddhism practices, the 
majority/minority status of Buddhist members and the levels of economic development. 
The majority of Mongolians follow Tibetan Buddhism while Therevada Buddhism is 
widely practiced in Thailand. As for Japan, Mahayana Buddhism is the largest religion. 
The three countries also differ in terms of the distribution of Buddhist populations. 
In Thailand, the vast majority (93.2%) of the population is Buddhist, as compared to 
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only 36.2% in Japan (Hackett et al. 2012). Meanwhile, while slightly over half of 
Mongolians are Buddhist, the proportion of those without religious affiliation comprises 
a little over one-third of the total population (Hackett et al. 2012). The 
majority/minority positions of Buddhists in each society may contribute to fertility 
disparities of Buddhists in the three countries. 
Likewise, these case studies represent Buddhism across very different economic 
development levels in 2010: Mongolia is a relatively poor country with a GDP per head 
of 2,227 USD; Thailand has an intermediate economic development level with a GDP 
per head of 9,187 USD; while Japan is one of the richest countries in the world with a 
GDP per head of 45,774 USD (IMF 2011). Some studies find that as a country becomes 
modernized with the modern state taking over religious institutions in providing basic 
services such as education, health care and housing, the importance of religion in social 
life declines (McCleary and Barro 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2004). This implies that 
the influence of religion on fertility may be minimal in Japan as compared to Thailand 
and Mongolia. Descriptive statistics on religious distributions, children ever born, age 
at first marriage and average years of education is provided in Table 2. Tables 3, 4 and 
5 present the results from Poisson regression estimates of the number of children ever 
born in Mongolia, Thailand and Japan respectively. For Mongolia and Japan, “no 
religion” is used as a base category while for Thailand, “other religion” is used. Next, 
we discuss the statistical results for each country. 
 
 
5.1 Mongolia 
The Mongolian Census (National Statistical Office of Mongolia 2010) revealed that 
Buddhists constitute 56% of the population, while 36% are unaffiliated. Mongolia has 
experienced a very rapid decline in fertility in recent decades (Spoorenberg 2009), from 
a TFR of above 7.5 children per woman in 1970–1975 to a TFR of 2.08 in 2000–2005 
and again an increase to a TFR of 2.37 in the 2005–2010 period (UNPD 2013). 
According to the latest census conducted in November 2010, the country counts 2.65 
million inhabitants (National Statistical Office of Mongolia 2010). 
The Reproductive Health Survey (RHS) for the year 2003 is employed for an in-
depth analysis of fertility patterns by religion. Note that we use the 2003 RHS data 
rather than the latest 2008 RHS since the variable „religion‟ is not available in the latter.  
The analysis is limited to the sample of women aged 25–49 divided into three religious 
groups: Buddhist, No religion or Other. The latter category includes those who declared 
themselves as Muslim (N=146), Protestant/Christian (N=84), and Other (N=16). 
Women of other religious groups (mainly coming from the Kazakh minority living in 
Western Mongolia) represent 3.8 per cent of the population aged 25–49. This minority 
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could potentially behave differently from a reproductive point of view and bear more 
children in order to strengthen their position in Mongolian society (according to the 
minority status hypothesis) (Goldscheider 1971).  
Table 2 reveals that Buddhists have slightly higher fertility than those with no 
religion, but lower fertility than those with other religions. Table 3 shows that after 
controlling for marital status, education, age, and residence in Model 2, those with 
Other religion have a significantly higher number of children than those with no 
religious affiliation. However, ceteris paribus, Buddhist women in Mongolia have 
similar fertility levels to non-religious women while exhibiting lower fertility than other 
religious groups. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for women age 25−49 
Country Religion N % 
Children ever 
born 
Age at first 
marriage 
Average years 
of education 
Mongolia All 6547 100 3,0 21,3 – 
(RHS 2003) Buddhist 3962 60.5 3,1 21,3 – 
  No religion 2339 35.7 3,0 21,4 – 
  Other (Christian/Muslim/Other) 246 3.8 3,3 20,9 – 
Thailand All 128219 100 2,0 – 6,6 
(Census 2000)
1
 Buddhist 122260 95,4 1,9 – 6,7 
  Muslim 5018 3,9 2,8 – 6 
  Christian 874 0,7 2,2 – 6,9 
  Other 67 0,1 2,1 – 3,1 
Japan All 4 124 100 1,5 24,8 13,2 
(JGSS 2000–2008)
2
 Buddhist 625 15,2 1,6 25 13,6 
  Very/Somewhat devoted 106 2,6 1,4 25,7 13,6 
  Not devoted 519 12,6 1,6 24,9 13,6 
  No religion 3 196 77,5 1,5 24,7 13,2 
  Non-Buddhist religion 303 7,4 1,6 25,2 13 
  Shintoist 22 0,5 1,3 25,2 13,5 
  Christian 69 1,7 1,5 26,2 13,7 
  New religion (Sokagakkai) 106 2,6 1,7 24,4 12,8 
  Other religion 106 2,6 1,7 25,3 12,8 
 
Notes: 
1
 The 2000 Population and Housing Census of Thailand, Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series,  International [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2012. 
2
 The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are designed and carried out by the JGSS Research Center at Osaka 
University of Commerce (Joint Usage / Research Center for Japanese General Social Surveys accredited by Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), in collaboration with the Institute of Social Science at the University of 
Tokyo. 
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Table 3: Mongolia – Poisson regression, dependent variable – number of 
children born to women 25−49 years old 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
exp(b) exp(b) 
Religious Affiliation      
Buddhist 1,040 ** 1,003  
Other religion 1,122 *** 1,097 *** 
No Religion 1  1  
Age     
25–29   0,484 *** 
30–34   0,746 *** 
35–39   1  
40–44   1,213 *** 
45–49   1,488 *** 
Marital status     
Not married   0,745 *** 
Married   1  
Education     
Primary or less   1,409 *** 
Incomplete secondary   1,312 *** 
Complete secondary   1,119 *** 
More than secondary   1  
Residence     
Urban   0,822 *** 
Rural   1  
Constant 2,959 *** 2,526 *** 
N 6547  6547  
Log-likelihood -12995,3  -11267,6  
d.f. 2  11  
 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Source: 2003 Reproductive Health Surveys, National Statistical Office of Mongolia, UNFPA, and Ministry of Health (2004). 
 
 
5.2 Thailand 
The 67 million Thais (in 2012) are mainly Theravada Buddhist (94%), followed by a 
smaller share of Muslims (5%) (Thailand Census 2000; UNDP 2013). Thai total 
fertility fell nationally from 6.14 in 1950–1955 to 1.99 children per woman in 1990–
1995 and further fell to 1.49 for the period 2005–2010 (UNPD 2013). The 
predominance of Buddhism may have facilitated reproductive change and family 
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planning policies implemented in 1971 as evident in contraceptive prevalence among 
married women of reproductive age, which had exceeded 70% by the 1990s (Knodel et 
al. 1999; NSO 1997; Nepomuceno 1991). 
Even before the family planning campaign in the 1970s, the Buddhist majority had 
lower fertility rates than the Muslim minority (both Thai and particularly Malay 
speakers). A relatively common view during the 1960s among Muslims in southern 
Thailand was that family planning and contraception was a sin, and they should accept 
the number of children given to them (Knodel et al. 1999; Ling 1969). Traditional 
interpretations of Islam in the Malay-speaking areas of southern Thailand and 
neighboring Kelantan in Malaysia led to lowered contraceptive use (Leete 1996; Leete 
and Tan Boon 1993). For instance, data from DHS 1987 (when religion was recorded) 
show that the overall TFR was 3.57: Buddhists had a TFR of 3.43, while Muslims had a 
TFR of 5.29. 
Trends in fertility for the largest religions in Thailand are presented in Figure 1. 
Buddhist women in Thailand tend to reduce their fertility from an earlier point in time 
and have lower fertility than Muslim or Christian women. However, we note that these 
religious groups also experienced a decline in fertility over time but at a slower rate 
than the national average. 
Since reproductive behavior is also determined by demographic, social and 
economic factors, the fertility difference among religious groups could be partly 
explained by the disadvantaged socioeconomic positions of Muslims in Thailand 
(Brown 2008). Based on the 2000 Census data available from IPUMS (Minnesota 
Population Center 2013), Table 4 presents the results from the Poisson regression 
analysis evaluating whether there is an effect of Buddhist affiliation on fertility once 
various controls are taken into account. In Model 1, we present results with only 
religion measures in place (modelled as Muslim, Buddhist, and Other). In Model 2, we 
present results with religion and background variables. We find that religion remains a 
significant factor even after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics including 
education, marital status, urban or rural residence, and age. Buddhists have significantly 
lower fertility than Muslims and members of other religious groups. 
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Figure 1: Own-children estimates of fertility (3-year period) by religion, 
Thailand, 1976–2006 
 
 
Sources: Our own calculations based on the 1990 and 2000 censuses in Thailand [Minnesota Population Center 2013] and 2005-06 
MICS microdata. 
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Table 4: Thailand – Poisson regression, dependent variable – number of 
children born to women 25−49 years old 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
exp(b) exp(b) 
Religious Affiliation  
    Buddhist 0,702 *** 0,697 *** 
Muslim 1  1  
Other 0,786 *** 0.795 *** 
Age 
    25–29 
  
0,682 *** 
30–34 
  
0,868 *** 
35–39 
  
1 
 40–44 
  
1,112 *** 
45–49 
  
1,253 *** 
Marital Status 
    Not married 
  
0,889 *** 
Married 
  
1 
 Education
1
 
    Primary or less 
  
1,376 *** 
Lower secondary 
  
1,209 *** 
Upper secondary 
  
1,092 *** 
More than secondary 
  
1 
 Residence 
    Urban 
  
0,881 *** 
Rural 
  
1 
 Constant 2,776 *** 2,256 *** 
N 101107 
 
101107 
 Log-likelihood -160652,7 
 
-155148,85 
 d.f. 2 
 
11 
  
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Source: Our own calculations based on the 2000 census in Thailand [Minnesota Population Center 2013]. 
 
 
5.3 Japan 
Japan, with its population of 127 million (2013 estimate by Statistics Bureau), has one 
of the lowest-low fertility rates in the world. Fertility in Japan fell to below replacement 
levels in 1970s and was estimated to be 1.34 children for the 2005–2010 period (UNPD 
2013). In Japan, 32% of the population is Buddhist (Mahayan strand), while 60% 
regard themselves as religiously unaffiliated (Inoguchi 2006). We surmise that the 
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predominance of non-affiliated individuals and Buddhist populations might, to a certain 
extent, contribute to low fertility in Japan. 
Using the pooled Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), repeated cross-
sectional social surveys for the years 2000−2008, we examine both the role of religious 
affiliation (which we also consider for Mongolia and Thailand) and a measure of 
religiosity for Buddhists. Respondents who answered that they follow a religion were 
further asked to identify how devoted they are to their religion given three possible 
answers: very devoted, devoted to a certain degree, and not very devoted. This question 
is used as a measurement of the degree of religiosity classified into devoted (“very 
devoted” and “devoted to a certain degree”) and non-devoted (“not very devoted”) 
groups. This allows us to investigate whether there is any difference between religious 
and less religious Buddhist followers.  
Table 5 shows Poisson regression models of the association between religiosity 
and religious affiliation (Buddhism, other religion, no religion) and fertility. We find 
that the effect of Buddhism on the number of children ever born is negative when 
compared to those with no religious affiliation, but not statistically significant. These 
effects are the same when age, marital status, education, and size of municipality are 
taken into account in Model 3. Furthermore, while devoted Buddhists appear to have 
higher fertility than non-affiliated individuals in Model 2, after controlling for relevant 
socio-demographic factors in Model 4, this difference disappears. Likewise, we do not 
find that the number of children ever born between devoted and non-devoted Buddhist 
women differ significantly. In sum, Buddhist belief, even among devoted adherents, is 
not significantly related to fertility in Japan. 
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Table 5: Japan ─ Poisson regression, dependent variable ─ number of 
children born to women 25−49 years old 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
exp(b) exp(b) exp(b) exp(b) 
Religious Affiliation  
        No religion 1  
   
1  
   Buddhist 1,048 
   
0,990 
   Other religion 1,084 * 
 
 1,020 
   Religiousity 
       
  
No religion 
  
1  
   
1  
 Non-devoted Buddhist 
  
0,952 
   
0,950 
 Devoted Buddhist 
  
1,067 * 
  
0,997 
 Other religion 
  
1,084 * 
  
1,020  
 Age 
        25–29 
    
0,581 *** 0,581 *** 
30–34 
    
0,819 *** 0,818 *** 
35–39 
    
1  
 
1  
 40–44 
    
1,050 
 
1,050 
 45–49 
    
1,050 
 
1,050 
 Marital Status 
        Never-married 
    
0,008 *** 0,008  *** 
Married 
    
1  
 
1  
 Divorced/widowed 
    
0,916 
 
0,917  
 Education
1
 
        lower secondary 
    
1,043
 
1,044  
 upper secondary  
    
1  
 
1  
 post-secondary 
    
0,946 * 0,946  * 
university and more 
    
0,858  *** 0,858  *** 
Residence 
        14 Largest cities 
    
0,895 *** 0,895  *** 
Other cities 
    
1  
 
1  
 Town/Village 
    
1,066 * 1,066  * 
Constant 1,627  *** 1,627  *** 2,057  *** 2,057  *** 
N 4123  
 
4123  
 
4123  
 
4123  
 Log-likelihood -6226,8  
 
-6225,9  
 
-5002,2  
 
-5002,1  
 d.f. 2  
 
3  
 
13  
 
14  
  
Notes: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
1
 Education is attended base. Educational levels under the Pre-WWII school system are converted to the current school system 
The levels of education correspond in the following; Lower secondary: junior high school. Upper secondary: high school. Post-
secondary: vocational school/junior college. University and more: university and graduate school. 
Source: Own calculations based on Japanese General Social Survey 2000–2008, Tanioka, Maeda, and Iwai (2010). 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
Our results suggest that Buddhist affiliation tends to be negatively or not associated 
with childbearing outcomes, controlling for observable socio-economic characteristics 
including education, residence, age and marital status. In spite of the highly diverse 
contexts under which the different types of Buddhism dominate, we do not have an 
example of Buddhist fertility being significantly higher than that of other religions 
except for Cambodia. Although the results vary between the highly diverse contextual 
and institutional settings we investigate, we find evidence that Buddhist affiliation or 
devotion is not generally related to elevated fertility across these very different cultural 
settings. 
Generally, previous studies have found that those who have a religion tend to have 
higher fertility than the religiously unaffiliated. However, in the two countries in our 
study that have significant unaffiliated populations (Mongolia and Japan), Buddhist 
fertility is not higher than the fertility of the unaffiliated. The recent study of religious 
differences in fertility behaviour in Japan, Korea and Singapore reported a similar 
finding of no particular effect of being a Buddhist on the actual number of children 
(Kojima 2014). Furthermore, our results are also in contrast to earlier findings showing 
that greater religiosity is related to higher fertility. We found that more devout 
Buddhists in Japan do not appear to have higher fertility than less devout Buddhists. In 
models that control for demographic characteristics, these findings support our 
hypothesis that having a Buddhist religious faith does not lead to greater fertility.  
The three countries under analysis differ not only in the religious strain of 
Buddhism, but also in the population shares that declare Buddhism as their religion. 
More than 93 % of the population in Thailand stated to be of Buddhist affiliation as 
compared to 55% in Mongolia and only 36% in Japan (Hackett et al. 2012). Whether 
one‟s religion has a minority status or not may potentially affect childbearing outcomes. 
Indeed, the higher levels of Muslim fertility in Thailand are consistent with the minority 
status hypothesis which postulates that the insecurities of minority group membership 
may increase fertility when a group prefers separation from the larger society and are 
committed to pronatalist norms (Knodel et al. 1999). On the other hand, despite having 
a minority status, the absence of pronatalist ideology in Buddhism in general does not 
influence the reproductive behaviors of Buddhist devotees in Japan.  
This finding highlights the importance of theology for fertility preferences. Many 
religions have explicit rules and teachings about family issues and childbearing. 
Religious control over family behaviors can take the form of prohibition or rewards. For 
instance, divorce is prohibited in Catholicism. Meanwhile, religions such as 
Mormonism deliberately provide incentives to have many children through granting 
psychic and social rewards in the form of approval, social status and blessings (Stark 
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and Finke 2000). Similarly, Muslims in Thailand perceive contraception as a sin and 
consider it is a duty to accept the number of children Allah gives (Knodel et al. 1999).  
In contrast, Buddhism lacks unequivocal pronatal teachings and generally tends to 
provide little opposition to most forms of contraception. We find that Buddhist 
teachings do not require followers to have high fertility levels and are more ambivalent 
regarding procreation, contraception and abortion than the Abrahamic religions. 
Further, the fact that Buddhist practice often lack rigid formalities and concepts of 
taboo (Keown 2005) can help explain the absence of religious obligation on family 
formation and childbearing.  
 Buddhist religion and religious practice may represent a spiritual alternative to 
family formation rather than a precursor (Schak 2008). Hence, each religious group 
may change in response to socioeconomic development at a different pace, according to 
the interaction hypothesis proposed by Chamie (1981). For instance, in the case of 
Thailand, although family planning policies implemented in the 1970s contributed to 
overall fertility decline, the adoption of such programs was much slower among the 
Muslim community (Knodel et al. 1999). 
Although a religious denomination may have teachings related to demographic 
behaviors, several factors are necessary for religion to influence fertility, such as means 
of communication, enforcement of compliance as well as a high degree of attachment 
within the religious community (McQuillan 2004). Along similar lines, the way 
Buddhism is practiced in the three countries studied may result in different levels of the 
influence of religion on childbearing. Our results suggest that the largest fertility 
difference between Buddhist followers and members of other religions is in Thailand. 
One explanation for smaller religious differences in Mongolia and Japan is possibly 
because the two countries are relatively more secularized than Thailand. The repression 
of religious practices under the communist regime in Mongolia until 1991 and 
modernization as well as the explicit separation between the state and religion in the 
Japanese constitution after World War II contribute to lower religiosity in the two 
countries. Thus, apart from the higher number of non-affiliated individuals in Japan and 
Mongolia compared to Thailand, members of religious groups may also be less 
religious. Fertility differentials by religion in the former two countries therefore are not 
as evident as in Thailand.  
Another explanation lies in the fact that unlike Mongolia and Japan, there are 
virtually no unaffiliated individuals in Thai society. This is possibly because official 
documents such as birth registrations and identity cards in Thailand record information 
on religious affiliation. As a predominant Buddhist country, individuals may be inclined 
to identify their religious affiliation as Buddhism without actually practicing. Since 
Thai Theravada Buddhism emphasizes individual autonomy and responsibility where a 
person‟s store of merit is primarily of his/her own doing, the nature of a Buddhist 
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affiliation is contingent on individual practice. On the other hand, being a Muslim or 
Christian in Thailand requires more devotion as a means to distinguish oneself from the 
majority Buddhists, as reflected in the 2005−2008 World Values Survey and East-Asian 
Barometer, which shows that Muslims and Christians in Thailand consider themselves 
to be more religious and attend religious services more regularly than do Buddhists. 
Likewise, the practice of voluntary veiling among Muslim women is also a powerful 
symbol of identity and commitment to Islamic values (Marddent 2013). The greater 
devotion interacting with pronatalist ideology in Islam and Christianity thus have led to 
higher fertility among Muslims and Christians in Thailand. 
Despite differences in the schools of Buddhism and the level of socioeconomic 
development and secularization, empirical results from the three countries under 
examination consistently show that Buddhists have slightly lower or insignificantly 
different fertility than other religions and are on par with those having no religious 
affiliation. While Buddhism is concentrated in Asian countries, there are a growing 
number of adherents in different parts of the world (including in western countries) 
partly due to migration and conversion (Baumann 1995). There is indeed some 
evidence suggesting that Buddhist fertility is relatively low outside of the Asian 
context. For instance, in Australia, adjusting for education and income, 40−44 year old 
Buddhist women have the lowest number of children ever born of any religious group, 
approximately half a child lower than the Christian majority (who have about 2.1 
children) – and even 0.2 children less than those without religion (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2006). Similarly, the 2000 Swiss Census reports that the birth rate per woman 
is only 1.42 for Buddhists, slightly lower than the Swiss average of 1.43 (Blume 2009). 
Given below replacement level fertility in most European countries, Buddhism may 
have less influence on fertility behavior than in the Asian countries presented in this 
paper. This further raises an interesting question – would an increase in the adoption of 
Buddhist doctrine result in lower fertility and in which context? 
The prevalence of Buddhism in many Asian nations could represent an important 
reason for their low fertility. We recommend that future studies use additional datasets 
to test the relationship between Buddhist affiliation and degree of devotion on fertility 
in other contexts. Patterns of Buddhist fertility should be explored outside the Asia-
Pacific region, as it would be interesting to study how Buddhist family dynamics play 
out in other contexts given this religion‟s recent growth in several parts of the world. 
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